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The purpose of this paper is to model competition in freight transport and to work out the role
of the government in providing infrastructure for the competitors. Freight transport could in
principle be provided by the firm itself by using firm-owned trucks or transportation services
could be outsourced by purchasing these services from rail and/or truck transport firms. We
link production in the rest of the economy to transport demand, provided by two competing
modes of transport. Since congestion is an increasing cost component in densely populated
countries, we develop an index of congestion which can be controlled by investing in highway
infrastructure. Given infrastructure, a fuel tax and the stock of vehicles, we first derive the
conditional demand functions of the economy for truck and rail services. The two transport
firms know these demand functions and compete in prices. We then propose a transportation
policy which chooses two types of infrastructure, highways and the railway system, and a fuel
tax in order to maximize welfare. The economic aspects for an optimal provision of the two
types of infrastructure can be expressed by a set of unknown elasticities which measure the
impact of infrastructure services on price and quantity variables in transport industries. With
time series data for the German economy we measure these impacts on prices in the rail and
truck industries, on the volume of transport, on congestion, and on the utilization of the stock
of transportation equipment.
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1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to set up a model which analyzes competition in the input market
“traffic and transportation”. A partial equilibrium model for the transport market is described
that allows to analyze and optimize simultaneously transport dimensions of pricing and of
provision of road and railway infrastructure. The emphasis is more on future competition
given the liberalization and deregulation of this market in the EU. It is expected that price
competition between different modes of transportation will increase. However, transportation
by truck is hampered by insufficient infrastructure in highways and roads experienced every
day by traffic congestion. On the other side, the steady increase in air pollution from truck
transport curtails any incentive to extend the highway system. Although the railway is an
environmentally friendly substitute, its problem is that it is heavily indebted and requires a
fundamental reorganization in order to be a stable and serious competitor to the truck
industry. Forecasts report a growth in freight transport by 40 per cent in Central Europe up to
the year 2010, but for the railway such an outlook is only partly favorable because its
competitors are professionals, well organized in small and efficient firms in the truck
transportation business whereas the railway has only made first steps in the last years to
become a profit maximizing company.
A detailed model of competition in traffic modes has to take into account the new
organizational structure of the railway in terms of three subdivisions – passengers, freight, and
the railway system. In passenger transport, a distinction in long-distance and short-distance
traffic is necessary because competitors are different. In the freight transport, the competitors
are the truck industry, transport by ship or airline, and trucks owned by firms in the
manufacturing industry. The railway, a natural monopolist if seen from the cost side, has a
huge fixed cost bloc which consists of the railway system, stations, tunnels and bridges. In the
German reorganization of the railway, a new subdivision is responsible for investment in and
care of this system and for marketing its services to suppliers of passenger and freight
transport. In this paper we treat this subdivision as a public agency which invests in railway
3infrastructure and which charges user costs for the services from it. From 1994 on, all firms
which want to be engaged in the railway transport business can use it by paying fees.
The goal of the railway firm to gain market shares in transport can only be realized if
quality and price of its main input, the railway system, raises its competitive position. We
assume that decisions of this new federal railway system agency are not made independently
from those of a public highway authority which decides on the length and quality of road
infrastructure. This means that the transport policy is considered to be a simultaneous decision
process which provides infrastructure for both competitors. Competition is in freight transport
and also with trucks owned by firms. They can either outsource those services or can purchase
inputs to produce these services within the firm.
The literature on intermodal competition analyzes the second-best pricing and
infrastructure investment rules in the presence of exogenous price distortions and financing
constraints. Braeutigam (1979) deals with optimal pricing in regulated firms and concentrates
on the interactions among rail, motor, and water carriers. As rail is characterized by
economies of scale, its profits would be negative if its services were all priced at marginal
cost. He therefore investigated an optimal departure from marginal cost pricing. Since we
consider the period after deregulation, in our paper the rail rents the services from a railway
system firm and competes with other modes in order to make non-negative profits. On the
background of historical price distortion in the rail and trucking industries, Friedlaender and
Mathur (1982) are interested in the optimal provision of infrastructure. For determining its
optimal level, the first-best rule is an equalization of marginal investment benefits and costs.
However, in the presence of institutional constraints that prevent prices from being set
according to first-best rules, the optimal investment rules must be modified accordingly, and
second-best investment rules will be related to the nature of the existing price distortions.
They analyze the second-best structure of input and output taxes and of investment rules in
the context of the distortions with specific emphasis on the role of intermodal competition and
input taxes. The government provides the transportation infrastructure for all modes which is
used by the private sector to produce freight services. In Nilsson (1992) insufficient pricing of
road traffic externalities results in over-use of trucks. He therefore adjusts the split of
transport assignments between road traffic and rail by rail-user fees below their first-best
optimal level in order to offset the over-use of trucks. Prices below marginal costs do,
however, result in a larger volume of transport than would be optimal. The consequence of
this pricing policy is that investment in both modes has to be contracted.
4In our paper the analysis of the structure of investment rules and input taxes is done in
two stages as in Friedlaender and Mathur (henceforce FM) and in Nilsson. Each mode is
assumed to maximize profits, taken as exogenous a fuel tax and the level of infrastructure
determined by the government. Contrary to FM and Nilsson we assume price competition and
determine the Nash solution for output prices and the factor demands as functions of the
policy variables. At the second stage the government determines the levels of infrastructure in
order to maximize social welfare. Whereas FM and Nilsson assume that price and output
changes in the transportation sector do not cause price changes throughout the economy, we
follow a different approach. We model transportation as an input for the rest of the economy.
The cost of this input affects consumers’ and producers’ surplus in that economy. The
government is therefore not concerned about consumer surplus in the transportation industry
but about profits in that industry and about consumer and producer surplus in the rest of the
economy. Furthermore, cross-market effects, produced by variations in the two types of
infrastructure, have been suppressed by Nilsson but will be in the center of our analysis. One
of our objective is to formalize the industrial organization structure of this market in a manner
relevant for a transport policy analysis after deregulation. We finally have introduced
congestion which increases the cost of road transport for the economy. Congestion is
endogenous in our approach because investment in highways will reduce this negative
externality.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we set up a model of production for the
rest of the economy with transportation as an input. In section 3 we model price competition
between the two modes of transportation. In section 4 the government maximizes welfare of
the economy choosing as instruments infrastructure investments for road and rail and the fuel
tax for pricing negative externalities. In section 5 we specify cost functions for the transport
industries and for the rest of the economy for a parametric characterization of the input
market. The results of this empirical analysis are used in section 6 for a regression analysis in
order to test economic aspects which influence the levels of infrastructure services. Section 7
concludes the paper.
2. Transportation as an input for the economy
We begin with the economy, transport modes excluded, which we denote by manufacturing. It
produces its output by using, besides conventional inputs like labor and material, three
5transport inputs, namely commercial trucks (T1), railway (T2) and a business owned capital
stock of trucks (KZ). Aggregate transport T is produced by a sub-production function
(1) T T T T F KZ= ( , , , )1 2
where F is fuel. KZ is related to an utilized stock of vehicles (K), but has been downward
adjusted by an index of congestion Z ≥1.1 We specify KZ, the effective stock, as
(2) KZ K Z= ⋅ ≥−γ γ 0 .
Utilized K depends on the stock of trucks ( )K 0  in the rest of the economy as well as on the
availability of infrastructure KI. We express this relation by
(3) K K
KI
=
−FH IK >0 0exp ,α α
where KI →∞  implies a full utilization of the stock K0.
Since we assume that K0 and KI are fix in the short run, the variable cost function for
transport is:
(4) CT CT T p p p KZF= ( , , , , )1 2
where p p1 2, , and pF  are the input prices for truck services, rail and for fuel. It is
(5) ∂
∂
<
∂
∂
<
∂
∂
>
CT
KZ
CT
K
and CT
Z
0 0 0, .
The unit cost function for the intermediate good ‘transport’ is:
(6) PT CT
T
PK K
T
=
⋅
+
⋅( )
where PK is the user cost of the services from K. We assume that part of the fuel costs are
                                                          
1 We give in section 5 a definition of congestion Z (see (46)).
6directly related to the use of K and define PK as
(7) PK PK r p tF F F= + + + ⋅
0 ( ) ( )δ γ
PK0 is the price of a truck, r is the rate of return on risk-free government bonds, and δ  is the
rate of replacement. The complementary fuel input comes from decomposing fuel
consumption into a part, proportional to the utilized stock of vehicles with a factor γ F , and a
wasted part ~F , which can be reduced by less congestion and more infrastructure investment
(highways):
(8) F K FF= ⋅ +γ
~.
The specification of transport in (1) represents the aspect that manufacturing can either use its
own stock of vehicle, given congestion Z and infrastructure KI, or it can totally or partly
outsource this activity by buying the transport services from the truck industry or from the
railway company.
The manufacturing company maximizes profit under perfect competition:
(9) max ( , )
x
p x C x PT⋅ −
where x is output. Except for the price of transport PT, defined in (6), we have suppressed all
other input prices. The FOC is
(10) p Cx= .
The impact of KI on output can be derived from total differentiation:
(11) d x
d KI
T
C
d PT
d KI
x
xx
= − > 0
because of  d PT
d KI
< 0 and
(12) T C T x PTPT= = ( , )
7as the derived transport demand of manufacturing. In addition, the conditional demand
functions for the inputs T1 and T2, provided by trucks and by rail, can be derived from the cost
function C x PT( , ) by Shephard’s Lemma:
T C PT T PT T x PT PT T p p p t KZ Ki PT p p p F Fi i i= ⋅ = ⋅ = ⋅ +( , ) ( , , , , , )1 2
or
(13) T T T p p p t KZ Ki i F F= +( , , , , , )1 2
Prices of the transport modes, fuel prices, firms’ stock of trucks, congestion and the transport
volume affect the demand for the transport modes.
3. Price competition between trucks and the railway
We have derived in section 2 manufacturing’s input demand functions Ti ( )⋅  for two transport
services. They are provided by two transport firms which compete in prices. The problem of
the truck firm is
(14) max ( ) ( ( ), , )
p F
p T C T p KZ PK K
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Π = ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅
where the cost function depends on KZ K Z1 1= ⋅
−γ  with K1 as the service flow from the stock
of trucks K1
0. The interpretations given in (2), (3) and (5) are the same here. This holds also
for (7) and (8) with respect to PK1 and F1. The problem of the railway company is:
(15) max ( ) ( ( ), , )
p E
p T C T p K PK K
2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Π = ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅
where pE  is the price of electricity and K2 the service flow from the stock of capital
(producers’ durables) owned by the railway industry. Its effectiveness depends on the size of
the railway system KR provided by the government. Similar to (3) we assume the relationship
K K
KR2 2
0 2
= −
FH IKexp α  where K20 is the stock of trains ( )α 2 0> .
The FOC as implicit reaction functions in the prices are
8(16) T p T
p
C T
pi i
i
i
i T
i
i
i
+
∂
∂
−
∂
∂
=, 0
or
(17) p MC p ii i i
T pi i
− = − =
ε ,
, ,21
where ε T p i
i
i
i
i i
T
p
p
T,
=
∂
∂
< 0
is the price elasticity of input demand for traffic mode i. Solving (17) for the Nash equilibrium
in prices yields
(18)  ( , , , , , )p p T p p KZ KZ Ki i F E= 1 2
where T  in Ti  (see (13)) is assumed to be exogenous for the moment although it depends on
pi  (see 12)).
We finally determine fuel demand in manufacturing. From Shephard’s Lemma we
obtain
(19) F C x PT
p
C
PT
PT
p
T PT
p
CT
p
K PK
p
F K
F F F F F
F=
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
= + ⋅
( , ) ~ γ
where we kept T constant for simplicity. It is ~ ~ ( , ( ), , )F F x PT p KZF= ⋅  the non-complementary
fuel consumption which could partly be reduced by a better infrastructure due to less
congestion. Similarly,
(20) F
p
C PK K F K
F
F1 1 1 1 1 1=
∂
∂
+ ⋅ = + ⋅b g ~ γ
with ~ ~ ( , , )F F T p KZF1 1 1 1=  for the truck industry. When the government decides on investing in
highways or in the railway system, its goal is also to reduce the waste of fuel for
environmental reason.
94. A first-best infrastructure policy
The government provides infrastructure services by investing in the road system and in the
railway system. It is aware that investment in road construction increases the productivity of
the economy by improving the utilization of the stock of vehicles and by reducing the cost of
congestion to the economy. It also knows that road infrastructure improves the competitive
situation of the truck industry relative to the railway. Investment in the railway system in turn
helps both the railway and the environment because the substitution of train services for truck
services reduces the emission of nitrooxide (NOX) and carbon dioxide (CO2).2 We assume
that it is the objective of the government to maximize consumer surplus from the output x of
manufacturing, profit of manufacturing as well as profit of the truck and railway industries
minus the cost of the two modes of infrastructure and of environmental damage from traffic’s
emissions. As an additional instrument we add the fuel tax tF , although it is not used as a
mean to finance infrastructure investment. It internalizes the negative externality but does not
balance a financial budget restriction.
(21)
max ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( )
( )
, ,KI KR t
x
i i i i i
i
F
F
p d C x PT p T C PK K
PKI KI PKR KR D e TF t TF
ζ ζ
0 1
2
− + ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅
− ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅
=
D( )⋅  is the damage function with e as an emission coefficient and with total fuel TF as
(22) TF K K F FF= + + +γ ( )
~ ~
1 1 .
PKI and PKR are the public unit cost of the two types of infrastructure.3 They depend on the
                                                          
2 Since electricity is mainly produced from using fossil fuel, the railway is indirectly also an air polluter.
3 To see the difference between our approach and the approach chosen in the literature (Friedlaender and Mathur
(1982), Nilsson (1992)), we consider the single-mode case. Welfare in this literature is
 p d C T t KI PKI KI t TF
T
F F1
0
1 1
1z − − ⋅ + ⋅( ) ( , , )ζ ζ  ;
in our paper it is p d C x PT p T C T t KZ PK K PKI KI t TF D
x
F F( ) ( , ) ( ( , , ) ) ( )ζ ζ − + − − ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅z 1
0
1 1 1 1 1 1
.
Apart from the aspect of congestion and environmental damage, the crucial difference is that in our approach the
transportation industry produces an input T1 which permits to derive consumers’ and producers’ surplus in the
goods market.
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social rate of return rS, on the rate of replacement δ  and on the cost of a km highway ( )PKI 0
or railway system ( )PKR0 :
(23) PKI PKI r PKR PKR rS I S R= + = +
0 0( ) , ( )δ δ   .
The FOCs of problem (21) are
(24)            
( )
( )
,
,
p C d x
d KI
C d PT
d KI
p d T
d KI
T d p
d KI
C d T
d KI
PK d K
d KI
C d KZ
d KI
PKI MD e d TF
d KI
x PT i
i
i
i
i T
i
i
KZ
i
− − + + −
F
HG
I
KJ
− − − − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =
=1
2
1
1
1
1
1
0
and
(25)
( )
( )
,
,
p C d x
d KR
C d PT
d KR
p d T
d KR
T d p
d KR
C d T
d KR
C d K
d KR
PKR MD e d TF
d KR
x PT i i
i
i T
i
i
K
i
− − + + −
F
HG
I
KJ
− − − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =
=
1
1
2
2
2
2
0
and
(26)
p C d x
d t
C d PT
d t
p d T
d t
T d p
d t
C d T
d t
p
C PK K TF TF
t
t MD e
x
F
PT
F
i
i
F
i
i
F
i T
i
Fi
F F
F
i
− − + + −
F
HG
I
KJ
∂
∂
+ ⋅ + +
∂
∂
− ⋅ ⋅ =
=
b g
b g b g
,
( )
1
2
1 1 1 0
where MD is marginal damage. Since more of KI will increase transportation by trucks,
d TF
d KI
> 0  in (24) indicates an impact on damage although some waste of fuel will be reduced
due to less congestion because of ∂
∂
<
~F
KI
0 . But some emissions can be avoided by extending
the railway system which reduces fuel demand, indicated by d TF
d KR
< 0 in (25).
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For an interpretation of the FOCs we treat each of them as an implicit function,
determining one of the instruments given the other two. Our objective is therefore not a
simultaneous solution of the FOCs but we are interested in analyzing the economic aspects
behind setting optimal levels of the policy instruments. We first derive from (26) an optimal
fuel tax by using the FOCs (10) and (16) and the definition (22) (see the Appendix):
(27) t MD e TF
t
CT
p
p
t
p C T
p
T
p
p
pF
F
i
i
F
i i T
i
F
i
j
j
Fi
j i
i
i
= ⋅ ⋅ + ∂
∂
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
− −
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
F
H
GGG
I
K
JJJJ
L
N
MMMM
O
Q
PPPP=≠=
( )
( ) ( )
,
1
1
2
1
2 d i  .
The term behind p MCi i−  is positive because it reflects outsourcing of transportation by
manufacturing when fuel prices increase. Ti  is an input for manufacturing and a substitute for
own trucks. If user costs of trucks increase, demand for the substitutes Ti  increases. As
∂
∂
<
TF
tF
0, the tax should be below marginal damage if perfect competition prevails in the
transportation industry p MCi i=b g. The reason is the spillover effect of the tax on the prices
of the transportation modes, demanded by manufacturing. This increases the costs of
transportation and hence the costs of output x. Therefore a tax below MD offsets this negative
output effect. In case of p MCi i> , the option of outsourcing transport services to the non-
competitive transportation industry is a reason to add economic damage to the tax. Therefore,
the cost effect for manufacturing due to higher input prices from a fuel tax (a reason to set tF
below MD) is mitigated by the marginal economic damage of outsourcing transportation to an
imperfectly competitive industry (a reason to add this damage to the environmental damage).
We next determine economic and environmental reasons to provide an optimal stock
of infrastructure. Using the FOCs (10) and (16), then writing the derivatives in total
elasticities and solving (24) for the optimal infrastructure KI yields:
(28)
KI
PKI
PT T E p T E p T E
PK K E C E E MD e F
PT KI
i i
i
T KI i i p KI
i
K KI C KZ KZ KI net KI
i i
= − ⋅ ⋅ + − + ⋅
RST
UVW
− ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅
=
1
1
2
1 1 11 1 1 1
, , ,
, , , ,
ε
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where E d PT
d KI
KI
PTPT KI,
=  etc., and F K E K E TF Enet KI F K KI K KI TF KI, , , ~ ,: ( )
~
= ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅γ 1 1  summarizes
the net effect of a change in KI on fuel consumption. The first term in the brackets represents
a positive aspect for providing KI since EPT KI, < 0  because infrastructure reduces the cost of
transportation. The higher the cost savings, the more infrastructure services should be
provided. The second and third term (i =1, 2) are negative because of ET KIi , < 0. Infrastructure
improves the efficiency of trucks owned by manufacturing. Therefore demand for outsourced
truck services and for the railway is lower. This deteriorates the profit situation of these two
industries and slows down the incentive of the government to extend infrastructure
investment. The fourth and fifth term (i = 1, 2) are negative because of Ep KIi , < 0 (prices are
strategic complements). The reduction in the mark-ups of the truck and railway industry is not
intended by the government when  improving infrastructure services. The sixth term is also
negative because of EK KI1 0, > . It reflects the additional user cost of capital services in the
truck industry when infrastructure has improved the utilization of its stock of trucks. The
seventh term is positive and represents the reduction in the cost of congestion. KI improves
efficiency of the stock of trucks and reduces the congestion index Z because of EKZ KI1 0, > .
More efficient capital reduces costs of the truck industry ( ),EC KZ1 1 0< . Therefore, efficiency of
stocks and less congestion is a positive aspect for investment in infrastructure. The last term
expresses the negative environmental effect of an extended highway system. KI raises the
efficiency of the stock of vehicles and by that emissions from fuel input. Some fuel, however,
can be saved due to less waste of fuel from congestion ( , ~ ~ ~ )~ ,E TF F FTF KI < = +0 1 . Therefore,
excessive fuel consumption and emissions caused by congestion affect the optimal provision
of infrastructure.
There are still some effects which we have not mentioned yet because they are hidden
in the total elasticities. One of it is the savings in congestion costs by the rest of the economy.
This effect is included in the cost of transportation PT( )⋅ , which is a function of
T p p p KF, , , ,1 2  and KZ. If we wish to isolate all effects, we have to decompose the total
elasticities in a sum of partial elasticities. For EPT KI,   such a decomposition is (for a proof see
the Appendix)
E
PT T
CT CT
CT PK K
PT KI T KI CT p p KI
i
CT T T KI
CT KZ KZ KI K KI
i i, , , , , ,
, , ,
= − +
⋅
⋅ ⋅
L
NM + ⋅ ⋅
+ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅
=
ε ε ε ε ε
ε ε ε
1
1
2
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where ε CT p
i
i
i
CT
p
p
CT,
=
∂
∂
 , etc.
A similar decomposition can be done for ET KI1 ,  and Ep KIi ,  (see the Appendix). The next step is
to replace all total elasticities in (28) by their expressions in partial elasticities. Then all terms
are collected which  have the elasticity ε T KI,  in common, or the elasticity ε p KIi , , etc. This
procedure leads to a linear regression equation which can be estimated in the unknown
elasticities:
(29)
PKI KI x T KI x p KI x p KI x Z KI
x K K KI
T KI p KI p KI Z KI
K KI
⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
+ ⋅
+
− −
−
+
ε ε ε ε
ε
,
( )
,
( )
,
( )
,
( )
,
( )
( ; ) ( ; ) ( , ) ( ; )
( , ; )
1 2
1
1 2
1
where the signs indicate the ones we expect (we made the assumption that ε εK KI K KI, ,= 1 ). The
variable x T KI( ; ) > 0 includes all economic variables which are affected by an increase in
transportation demand T  induced by a higher KI:
(30) x T KI PT T CT p T p T MD e TFCT T i i
T p
T T i i p T
i
F T F T
i i
i i
( ; ) ~ ( ),
,
, , ~ , ~,
= ⋅ − ⋅ + − + ⋅
F
HG
I
KJ− ⋅ ⋅ +=ε ε ε ε ε ε1
2
1 1
 .
The transportation relevant variables in x T KI( ; ) are weighted by elasticities which emphasize
the importance of the corresponding variable when T changes. If a weight is unity, the impact
is a direct one (e.g. PT T⋅ ). A higher T can increase costs CT (negative aspect), can increase
profit in the duopoly due to higher Ti  and prices pi  (positive aspects). However, more T
implies more waste of fuel which has a negative impact in the calculation of the transportation
representing variable x T KI( ; ).
The variable x p KI( ; )1 0<  includes economic variables which are affected by price
changes for truck services induced by KI. These variables are transportation costs in the
economy CT and profits in the duopoly.
(31) x p KI CT p TCT p i i
T pi
T p
i i
i
( ; ) ,
,
,1
1
2
1 1
= − ⋅ −
=
ε
ε
ε  .
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A lower p1 means cost saving in the economy, a lower mark-up in the truck business and a
higher one in the railway. If ε p KI1 ,  in (29) turns out to be negative, the price effect has a
positive impact on the provision of KI.
The variable x p KI( ; )2 0<  includes economic variables which are affected by price
changes for railway transportation.
(32) x p KI CT p TCT p i i
T pi
T p
i i
i
( ; ) ,
,
,2
1
2
2 2
= − ⋅ −
=
ε
ε
ε  .
Since prices are strategic complements, a higher KI lowers also p2. Therefore the explanation
of x p KI( ; )2  is similar to the one given for x p KI( ; )1 .
The variable x Z KI( ; ) < 0  includes economic variables which are affected by
congestion. Costs, prices, transportation demand and fuel consumption are weighted by
elasticities representing the importance of the corresponding variable in providing
infrastructure. A lower congestion index Z due to more KI raises the effective stock of
vehicles KZ which gives rise to cost savings and price reduction:
(33)           
x Z KI CT p T p T p T
C MD e TF
CT KZ
i i
T p
T KZ i i p KZ i i p KZ
i
C KZ F KZ F KZ KZ Z
i i
i i i
( ; )
~ ( )
,
,
. , ,
, ~ , ~, ,
= − ⋅ + − + + ⋅
F
HG
I
KJ
− ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ +
=
ε
ε
ε ε ε
ε ε ε ε
1
1 1 1 1
1
2
1
First of all, ε KZ Z, < 0  at the end of (33) turns costs into cost savings because a lower Z raises
the effective stock of vehicles. The higher KZ, in turn, lower cost CT in the economy (the
weight is ε CT KZ, < 0), reduces profits in the duopoly because firms prefer to use own trucks,
lowers the prices pi  due to competition with manufacturing owned trucks, lowers prices of the
duopolists and cost of trucks, and reduces the environmental damage effect.
Finally, economic variables included in x K K KI( , ; )1 0<  depend on the size of the
utilized stock of vehicles. Most of them represent the cost aspect of more KI, some the benefit
aspect, but the emphasis is here on the cost of production.
(34)      
x K K KI PK K PK K MD e K K CT
p T p T C MD e TF
F CT KZ
i i
T p
T KZ i i p KZ
i
C KZ F KZ F KZ
i i
i i
( , ; ) ( )
~
,
,
, , , ~ , ~,
1 1 1 1
1
2
11 1 1 1 1
= − ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + − ⋅
+ − + ⋅
F
HG
I
KJ− ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ +=
γ ε
ε
ε ε ε ε ε{ }
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Again, if the effect is direct, the weight is one, if it is indirect, the weight in x K K KI( , ; )1  is the
corresponding elasticity. More KI results in  a better utilization of the stock of vehicles K 0
and K1
0 (see (3)). This raises capital costs, and has also a negative effect on the environment
(first three terms in (34)), it lowers the cost CT CT KZ( ),because of ε < 0 , it reduces the mark-
ups of the duopolists because business-owned trucks become more effective, and then there
are the positive effect of a higher KZ1  on costs C1and on wasting less fuel.
A regression equation, similar to (29), can be derived from (25) for the optimal
provision of the railway system KR. The variables x T KR x p KR( ; ), ( ; )1  and x p KR( ; )2  are
identical with the ones given in (30) - (32) because they reflect cost and benefit of
infrastructure in general. There is no variable x Z KR( ; ) because there is no direct effect of KR
on congestion costs. Since infrastructure KR affects only the prices p p1 2,  and the costs C2 of
the railway, the variable x K K KI( , ; )1  in (34) reduces to
(35) x K KR PK K p T Ci
i
i p K C Ki
( ; ) , ,2 2 2
1
2
22 2 2
= − ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅
=
ε ε  .
Our second regression, now for KR, is
(36)
PKR KR x T KR x p KR x p KR
x K KR x F KR
T KR p KR p KR
K KR F KR
⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
+ ⋅ + ⋅
+
− −
+
−
ε ε ε
ε ε
,
( )
,
( )
,
( )
,
( )
~,
( )
( ; ) ( ; ) ( ; )
( : ) ( ~; )
1 2
2
1 2
2
where x F KR MD e F( ~; ) ~= − ⋅ ⋅ . If ε ~,F KR < 0, environmental concern has a positive impact on
investment in the railway system.
The variables x( )⋅  are not directly observable, but have to be constructed from
behavioral equations for manufacturing and for the two competitors in transportation services.
All x( )⋅ ’s summarize positive and negative effects on sales and costs for the economy. They
will be influenced, if the government extends infrastructure services. Since we have neglected
a budget constraint and the necessity to finance infrastructure investment, we have omitted an
important allocative effect. As higher taxes are required if infrastructure services are provided
at no extra charge, it is not obvious that the benefits always offset the disincentive and
reallocating effect of taxation. However, as the creation of infrastructure promotes growth and
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attracts new firms - an aspect captured especially in x T KI( ; ) and x T KR( ; )  - the
corresponding higher tax revenues can in the long run finance the provision of infrastructure.
Our model includes at least a gasoline tax which could be used to finance infrastructure
investment.
In order to fill the x( )⋅  variables with numbers we have to specify functional forms for
deriving demand functions and mark-ups. We will do this in the following section.
5. Transport demand by manufacturing and competition in an input market – a
            specified model
Although the railway is much more concerned about its competitive situation after the
deregulation in 1994,4 we are fully aware of the fact that it is highly unrealistic to interpret the
railway performance in the last decade as the outcome of a duopolistic market structure. We
therefore do not estimate econometrically the firm specific elasticities, derived in the previous
section, but only calibrate them for a special year which was 1994. For the cost and revenue
figures which appear in the x-variables we employ, however, time series data. Before we
choose functional forms for the duopoly model, we should say some words to the competitive
situation before 1994.5
Privatization of the railway in 1994 ended the area of this natural monopolist. Once
the railway system as the fixed cost component has been the source for monopolistic power,
but competition between railway, motor vehicles and airplanes prevailed since several
decades. Separation of the railway system to a (still) government owned company was a first
step to strengthen the competitive position of the railway. As the road infrastructure is
provided by the government as is the infrastructure used by the airlines like runways and
terminals, it is reasonable to free all three competitors from their fixed network costs. In
addition, capacity restrictions and licenses in the truck business had to be abolished. Also
price formation, formerly determined by the ministry of transportation in order to protect the
railway and the inland navigation, was deregulated. One of such price measures was a special
tax on company owned trucks because they substituted to an increasing extent the services
from the heavily regulated truck business. In spite of all efforts to protect the railway, its
market share declined from 56% in the fifties to 20% in 1994. In the same period the market
                                                          
4 In 1997 the railway company complained about the lower fuel prices which have favored the competitor motor
vehicles and are one reason for the decline in revenue.
5 For a more comprehensive survey see Bowers (1996) and Börsch-Supan/Schnabel (1998).
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 share of road transport increased from 20% to 60%. Transfer payments from the government
of about 13 billion DM per year since 1980 were necessary for a survival of the railway. The
reason for the steady increase in commercial road transportation is the higher quality of the
goods to be transported (no mass products like iron or coal anymore), the just-in-time
production process, and the regional mobility of trucks. Competitive price setting therefore
required subsidies by the federal government to cover fixed cost and interest payments from
debts.
The EU deregulation reform in 1993 proposed an entrepreneurial independency of the
railway, a separation of the railway system from the transportation business, and free access
of competitors to the railway system. The task of the newly founded Federal railway office
(Eisenbahnbundesamt) is the expansion of the railway system. In 1999 there will be a stock
company DB Cargo AG as a competitor for truck transportation which need not to invest in
the railway system. Both the user of the road system as well as of the railway system have to
cover at last the yearly depreciation by paying user fees. As prices for truck transportation and
inland navigation have dropped by 30% after the abolition of the price control (once
introduced to support the railway), the cargo AG has to make enormous efforts to regain
market shares.
As mentioned above, we develop an econometric model for competitive interactions
between trucks, business owned trucks and between the railway, but we do only calibrate the
parameters for the year 1994. Our objective is to calculate the values of the firm-specific
partial elasticities in order to be able to calculate time series for the x-variables in the linear
regressions for the two types of infrastructure.
We assume the cost function for transport in manufacturing to be of the translog form
with constant returns to scale in T and KZ:
(37) ln
.
ln
.
ln
.
ln
.
ln ln
,
CT T KZ p p pK i
i
i ij
i j
i j= − + +
=
1 1 1
2
1
1
3 3
α
α
α α
α
α
β
where i = 3 is F (fuel), α α α α.= + +1 2 3  and α α.+ =K 1. Homogeneity of degree one in the
input prices implies β β βi i i i1 2 3 0 1 3+ + = =, ,2, . From Shephard’s lemma, manufacturing’s
demand functions for truck and railway services are:
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The price elasticities of input demand are:
(39)  ε βT p i ii
i
i i
w
w,
= − +1
where w p T
CTi
i i
= . These elasticities will be used for the mark-up conditions (17).
The cost function of the truck or railway industry are based on a Cobb-Douglas technology:
(40) ln
.
ln
.
ln
.
ln lnC T KZ p pK F F L L1 1 1
1 11
= − + +
τ
τ
τ τ
τ τb g
where pL  is the price of labor, τ τ τ.= +F L  and τ τ.+ =K1 1.
Similarly,
(41) ln
.
ln
.
ln
.
ln lnC T K p pK E E L L2 2 2
1 12
= − + +ζ
ζ
ζ ζ ζ ζb g
where pE  is the price of electricity, ζ ζ ζ.= +E L  and ζ ζ.+ =K2 1. Using the elasticities in (39)
and the MC-function from (40), the revenue-cost share of the truck industry follows from
(17):
(42) p T
C
w
w
w
w
1 1
1
1
11
1
1
11
1
1
1
=
− +
+
β
β τ .
where we have assumed that the share w1 is constant. The price p2 follows in a similar way.6
Based on our assumed specifications we can derive the firm-specific elasticities which
                                                          
6 We note from (42) that a Cobb-Douglas production technology for manufacturing is excluded if input demand
functions are used for imperfect competition between input producing firms. With β11 0= , the Bertrand price
p1 would be negative.
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are needed to calculate the variables xi. The elasticities which enter x T KI( ; ) are:7
(43)
ε ε
α α
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α τ
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In order to calibrate the parameters in a given base year, we need to know manufacturing’s
cost shares w p T
CTi
i i
=  and the three cost of capital shares. The latter one can be derived from
the envelope condition, which states that the partial derivative of the variable cost function
with respect to capital – the endogenous ex-post price of capital – is equal to the given ex-ante
price of capital. Or, written in cost shares:
−
∂
∂
=
⋅ln
ln
C
K
PK K
C
1
1
1 1
1
and similar for K2. Using our specifications, the shares are
(44) PK K
C
PK K
C
K
K
K
K
1 1
1
2 2
2
1
1
2
2
1 1
⋅
=
−
⋅
=
−
τ
τ
ζ
ζ,
With data for these cost shares, we can calculate τ K1  and ζ K2 , and therefore some of the
elasticities. Furthermore, from cost minimization of manufacturing with respect to K, we
obtain the FOC: ∂ ∂ =C x PT K( , ) 0 , or, using the specifications (2), and (6):
(45) − ∂
∂
=
⋅ln
ln
CT
K
PK K
CT
    ,          i.e.   PK K
CT
K
K
⋅
=
−
α
α1
when using the specification of CT (see (37)). We finally have to find a value for ε KZ Z,  the
elasticity of vehicle stock utilization with respect to congestion (i.e. for −γ ), which appears in
                                                          
7 For the other elasticities see the Appendix.
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x Z KI( ; ) . For that purpose we have to define our index of congestion Z. Similarly as in
Conrad (1997), Z is assumed to be a geometric mean of the following type
(46) Z K
K
K
K
=
F
HG
I
KJ
F
HG
I
KJ ≥ >
−0
0
1
0
1
0
1
1 0
 
,
β β
β  .
K 0 is the required stock of vehicles under the present insufficient provision of infrastructure
services KI including congestion. This stock can be utilized only to a certain percentage,
according to (3); let us say 95 per cent. Since truck drivers experience congestion, the
effective stock, KZ, enters the cost function CT, implying higher variable costs than under the
higher K or K 0. With K 0 where K K0 0<d i we denote the lower stock of vehicles required if
infrastructure is provided in an efficient manner. This means that infrastructure KI  has been
provided according to the principle that its marginal benefit is equal to its marginal cost
including the cost of public funds. This does not necessarily imply that Z should be one in that
case, i.e. that there should be no congestion. However, for our calibration we will assume that
Z is equal to one. Since in that case less vehicles are required to transport the quantity T, K 0 is
less than K 0, and Z ≥1 follows according to (46).8 With the under-utilized K and the
observed cost CT the parameter α K  can be calculated from (45).
 9
Using data from the national accounts and from an input-output table it is therefore
possible to calculate the x-variables for a regression analysis.
6. Optimal provision of infrastructure and its impact on the economy – a regression
            analysis
For our empirical analysis we need data for three cost definitions.
CT p T p T p F PK KF= ⋅ + + ⋅ + ⋅1 1 2 2
~  are the costs of transportation for manufacturing with PK
as defined in (7). We assume that 90 per cent of the fuel input are complementary to trucks.
We use input-output tables to construct the data. The number of trucks owned by
manufacturing are published in the Statistical Yearbook. The same holds for the number of
trucks owned by the truck-transport industry. Profit of the truck industry is
                                                          
8 The arguments are similar in case of K1
0  and K1
0.
9 For more detail and an example see the Appendix.
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Π1 1 1 1 1 1= − − ⋅p T C PK K
where C1 =  wages + cost of material + p FF ⋅
~
1 . We have included the cost of material which
can easily be incorporated in our analytical part in the preceding section.10 In addition, the
costs of the railway are C2 =  wages + cost of material + cost of electricity. Fixed capital costs
are PK K PK K r2 2 2
0
2⋅ = ⋅ +( )δ  where PK K20 2⋅  is the value of the net stock of producers
durables of the railway, published in Verkehr in Zahlen.
The elasticities ε T pi i,  are calculated by multiplying the FOC in (17) by Ti and by using
the specification for Ci in (40) or (41), respectively. For the truck industry, for example:
(47) p T C p T
K
1 1 1
1 1
1
1
1
1
−
−
= −
τ ε
which can be solved for ε T pi i, . In the same way, ε T p2 2, can be calculated. Finally, β ii  follows
from (39). Since the railway makes losses, we had to assume a rate of return for the railway
which was low enough to guarantee that the left hand side of (47) for the railway is
positive.11/12
Since trucks do not pay for using the highway system we assumed that the railway
does not have to pay for the railway system. Its capital stock is the infrastructure variable KR
and can be calculated by subtracting from total capital of the railway the figure for K2 (see
Verkehr in Zahlen). A time series for the capital stock of the highway system, KI can also be
found in Verkehr in Zahlen. These data have been used to determine the endogenous variables
in the two regressions (29) and (36). When calculating the x-variables, we kept the elasticities
from the base year 1994 constant and used yearly cost and revenue datas to construct time
series from 1980 to 1996.
Data on marginal damage MD are based on a study by Weinreich et al. (1998). They
estimated external costs of road and rail freight traffic in 1995. We use only their estimate for
external costs for air pollutants and exclude costs from noise or from accidents. Their cost
                                                          
10 The efficiency parameter α  in (3) has been calibrated such that only 90 per cent of the stock K 0  (K1
0
respectively) is utilized given the present infrastructure.
11 Note that ζ K2  in the corresponding equation (48) for rail is derived from (44).
12 The congestion index Z has been constructed along the lines mentioned in the preceding section. We found Z =
1.1. We then assumed that the utilization of vehicles is reduced from congestion by 5 per cent. According to (2)
this implies 0 95. = −Z γ . Since Z = 1.1, we obtain γ =1 7.  for the elasticity ε γKZ Z, = −  in x Z KI( ; ) .
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estimate was about 30 DM/1000 tkm (ton kilometer). Since we measure fuel input in liter, we
constructed an “emission” coefficient e as the ratio of tkm driven by trucks per liter diesel. By
using MD of 30 DM, adjusted for inflation, fuel consumption and e as tkm/ltr. fuel, we
constructed a time series for the environmental variable.
Parameter estimates of the system as seemingly unrelated are presented in the Table.
Table: Estimates of ε j KI,  and ε j KR j T p p Z K F, , , , , , ,
~
= 1 2 1 .
ε T
KI
KR
,FHG IKJ ε p
KI
KR1
,FHG IKJ ε p
KI
KR2
,FHG IKJ
ε Z KI,a f
ε
K KI
K KR
1
2
,
,
F
HG
I
KJ ε ~,F KRd i
x T KI( ; ) x p KI( ; )1 x p KI( ; )2 x Z KI( ; ) x
K K KI
K KR
, ;
;
1
2
0FHG
I
KJ< x F KR( ~; )
KI 0.104
(4.0)
n.s. n.s. -0.07
(2.0)
0.02
(0.7)
--
KR 0.023
(5.8)
n.s. n.s. -- -1.41
(-21.4)
-7.9
(-6.7)
It is by construction x T KI x T KR x p KI x p KR( ; ) ( ; ), ( ; ) ( ; )= =1 1  and x p KI x p KR( ; ) ( ; )2 2= . The
values in brackets are the t-statistics and n.s. means that the variable x has been dropped because
the parameter was “not significantly” different from zero. R2 was 0.9995.
The variable x T KI( ; ) represented the net benefit of transport as an input for the economy.
The estimated elasticity ε εT KI T KR, ,. .= =104 023or c h expresses that an increase in
infrastructure provision by one per cent would raise the volume of transport by 0.104 per cent
(or 0.023 for the railway system). Our model indicates that the impact from investment in
highways is much higher than the one from the railway system (about 4 times higher). The
variable x p KI( ; )1 0<  represents the negative aspects of an increase in the price of truck
services on transport demand and profit in the transport industries. We expected a negative
sign for ε p KIi  and ε p KRi , i.e. infrastructure investment reduces both prices because prices are
strategic complements. However, our estimated elasticities turned out to be not significantly
different from zero. We therefore dropped these two price variables from our two equation
regression. Maybe in ten years deregulation will induce price effects which then will turn out
to be significantly negative in sign.
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The variable x Z KI( ; ) < 0  measure the impact on the economy from congestion. The
estimated elasticity ε Z KI, .= −0 07 means that one per cent more infrastructure reduces the
congestion index Z > 1 by .07 per cent. The savings in congestion related costs supports an
extension of road infrastructure. Finally, x K K KI( , ; )1 0<  and x K KR( ; )2 0<  summarize the
costs and benefits to the economy from a more efficient utilization of the stock of vehicles.
ε K KI1 02, .=  indicates the positive effect of KI on the utilization of trucks (we had made the
assumption ε εK KI K KI, ,= 1 ). One per cent more infrastructure services raises the utilization by
0.02 per cent. Since the net impact of a better utilization of the stock of vehicles to the
economy is negative ( ( , ; ) )x K K KI1 0< , this aspect supports no extension of road
infrastructure; i.e. the user cost effect dominates the efficiency effect in providing more
infrastructure. The parameter is, by the way, insignificant. For trains, ε K KR2 1, .41= −  is
significantly different from zero but has the wrong sign. Extending the railway system raises
the user cost of durables for the railway company x K KR( , )2 0<b g. If it were ε K KR2 0, > , this
cost aspect slows down an extension of the railway system. With ε K KR2 0, < , the correlation is
positive, saying that irrespective of the user cost of railway’s durables their increase will not
slow down the extension of the railway system. In the data therefore dominates the efficiency
effect of a better railway system, given the stock of rail capital.
Finally, x F KR( ~; ) < 0 represents the damage to the environment from fuel
consumption and ε ~, .F KR = −7 9 means that an extension of the railway system by one percent
will reduce the waste of fuel due to inefficiency in the road network by 7.9 percent. This
aspect speaks in favor of providing more services by the railway system.
The regression analysis does not only permit to estimate infrastructure elasticities, it
can also be used to find weights to the economic aspects which explain the size of the user
cost of infrastructure. For instance, the transport volume in nominal terms ( ( ; ) )x T KI > 0
weighted by 0.104 (0.0023 for rail) explains part of the size of the infrastructure capital costs.
The fact that infrastructure reduces the cost of congestion ( ( ; ) )x Z KI < 0  accounts also a part
of the cost of infrastructure capital. If congestion related costs amount to ten billion DM, than
0.7 bill. DM out of the cost of infrastructure capital can be attributed to mitigate the
congestion problem. Finally, capital cost of the railway system ( )PKR KR⋅  has been increased
by 7.9 million DM, because fuel consumption from trucks causes environmental damages of
one million DM.
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7. Summary and Conclusion
Our objective has been to model a market which is an important input market for the
economy. We have restricted our analysis to freight transport demand by manufacturing. This
input factor could in principle be provided by the firm itself by using firm-owned trucks.
However, under certain economic conditions it is cost saving to outsource transport services.
The manufacturing industry can purchase trucks and employ truck drivers in order to handle
the transport volume or it can outsource its freight transport by purchasing these services from
rail and/or truck transport firms. Contrary to the literature we do not model an output market
which produces transport services and is controlled by the government via taxes and/or
infrastructure services, but we link production in manufacturing to transport demand,
provided by two competing modes of transport. Since congestion is an increasing cost
component in densely populated industrialized countries, we develop an index of congestion
which can be controlled by investing in highway infrastructure. Given infrastructure, a fuel
tax and the stock of vehicles, we first derive manufacturing’s conditional demand functions
for truck and rail services. The two transport firms know these demand functions and compete
in prices. Of interest in our analysis is also the derived demand for fuel in the economy
because the government wishes to internalize the negative externality of emissions from fuel
combustion. We then derive an optimal transportation policy which is based on two types of
infrastructure and a fuel tax. In the welfare measure included is consumer and producer
surplus of the good produced by manufacturing, profit of the two transport modes,
environmental damage from emissions and the public cost of infrastructure services. We
found that a first-best fuel tax should be below marginal damage since it raises prices of
inputs which are required by manufacturing to produce output for the economy. The optimal
provision of the two types of infrastructure depended on a number of economic aspects like
the volume of transport demand, the competitive situation in the truck and rail industries, the
cost of capital of the stock of vehicles or rail equipment, the cost of congestion and on
environmental damage.
From our mathematical analysis two sets of unknown elasticities came up – elasticities
which measure the response between variables chosen by economic agents, and elasticities
which measure the impact of infrastructure services on these variables. In order to estimate
the second set of elasticities econometrically, we had to specify cost functions for the
industries in order to compute demand functions and Nash prices. This procedure permitted us
to calculate the explaining variables in a two equation regression for the two types of
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infrastructure – the railway system and highways. The unknown parameters showed as
infrastructure elasticities the impact of infrastructure provision on prices in the rail and truck
industries, on the volume of transport, on congestion, and on the utilization of the stock of
transportation equipment in the economy. Since privatization and deregulation in the transport
industry have just started, the data reflect only roughly the situation we have described by our
model. Maybe after a decade of fierce competition in freight transport services in the
European Union, we know more about the empirical compatibility of our model with the
actual situation in the transport market.
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Appendix
Some remarks to the calculation of Z:
We first give some details on how K0 can be obtained, the optimal stock of trucks in case of
no congestion.
For determining K 0, we note that transport input T, produced by the production
function (1), is based on the effective stock KZ. The optimal K  produces also T  but with
lower variable cost CT  due to sufficient infrastructure KI  to reduce Z to one. Therefore K  is
derived from (45) with CT from (37) under the assumption that Z = 1; i.e. KZ = K. For the
base year we obtain
CT T KK
K
K 
=
−
−
−
1
1 1α
α
α
which has to be substituted for CT in (45). This yields
K
PK
TK
K
K
=
−
F
HG
I
KJ ⋅
−
α
α
α
1
1
1
.
This desired demand of capital is lower than K. This alone would imply a lower stock than K 0
before. Since the utilization factor exp

−FH IKαKI  has improved under KI KI > , a new and lower
stock K 0 follows from (3) as   exp (  )K K KI0 = α . Now Z in (46) can be calculated.
An example for the calculation of Z:
Let us assume a simple production function
(A1) T L KZK K= −1 α α( )
The demand for labor is L T KZK
K
K
=
−
−
−
1
1 1α
α
α
Total costs are C P L PK KL= ⋅ + ⋅
and variable costs CT are CT q T KZL K
K
K
= ⋅
−
−
−
1
1 1α
α
α
We assume the following numbers:
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PL = 1 ,  L = 200 (therefore CT = 200) ,  K 0 = 1000 ,  α  = 500  and  KI = 10.000.
According to (3): K K= ⋅ −FH IK0 50010 000exp .
=K 950
 With PK K= 0 1. , α  follows from (43):
PK K
CT
K
K
⋅
= =
−
=
95
200 1
0α
α
.475
=α K 0 322.
We assume KZ to be 90% of K because of inefficiency of congestion, i.e. KZ = 855
To corresponding T follows from (A1)
T = ⋅ =−200 855 319 31 0 322 0 322. . .
Next we determine K  from
 
( )
K
PK
CTK
K
K
K
=
−
⋅ =
−
α
α
α
α1
1
1
=
−
F
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I
KJ
=
FH IK ⋅
=
−
−

.475
.
( . )
.
.
K
PK
TK
K
K
α
α
α
1
1
0 1
0 1
319 3
918 32
1
1 0 322
Let KI  be equal to 11.000, i.e. 10% higher than KI. Then K0 follows from:
 .  exp
.
K K= = ⋅ −FH IK918 32 50011 0000
that is K0 961=
The index is therefore:
Z K
K
= = =
0
0
1000
961
1 0406

.
γ  for ε γKZ Z, = −  can be found by using the definition (2):
855 950 1 0406= ⋅( . )γ
or γ = 2 64.
Proof of (27):
The FOC with respect to tF , using (19) and (20), is:
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which proves (27).
Total elasticities as function of partial elasticities.
Proof of EPT,KI :
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L
NM
O
QP= −
+ + + + + ⋅
L
NM
O
QP
1 1
1
2
1 2
1 2
or
d PT
d KI
KI
PT
KI
T
d T
d KI PT T
CT p CT p CT T
CT KZ PK K
p p KI p p KI T T KI
KZ KZ KI K KI
= − +
⋅
⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅
+ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅
1
1 1 2 21 2
ε ε ε
ε ε
, , ,
, ,
This yields the expression for EPT KI, . Although we could derive
d T
d KI
T d x
d KI
T d PT
d KIx PT
⋅
= +
af
and could exchange  d T
d KI
 in EPT KI,
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to get d x
d KI
 as the effect of KI on x to be estimated, we stopped with d T
d KI
 as the effect to be
estimated.
Proof of ET KI1 , :
d T p p T KZ
d KI
T d p
d KI
T d p
d KI
T d T
d KI
T d KZ
d KIp p T KZ
1 1 2
1
1
1
2
1 11 2
, , ,
, , , ,
b g
= + + +
which can be written in terms of elasticities as
ET T p p KI T p p KI T T T KI T KZ KZ KIKI1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1, , , , , , , ,= ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ε
Proof of Ep KIi , :
d p T KZ KZ K
d KI
p d T
d KI
p d KZ
d KI
p d KZ
d KI
p d K
d KI
i
i T i KZ i KZ i K
 ; , ,
, , , ,
1 2 1 2
1 2
b g
= + + +
Therefore, in terms of partial elasticities:
Ep KI p T T KI p KZ KZ KI p KZ KZ KIi i i i, , , , , , ,= ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ε ε ε ε ε ε1 1             (It is  
d K
d KI
2 0= ).
Furthermore, it is
d K
d KI KI
KI1 2=
α   and   E
KIK KI1 1
, =
α
d KZ
d KI
Z d K
d KI
K Z d Z
d KI
K Z
KI K KI Z KI
1 1
1
1 1
1
= + − =
⋅
− ⋅
FH IK− − −
−
+ −
γ γ
γ
γ ε γ εa f
af af, ,
or
EKZ KI K KI Z KI1 1 0, , ,= − ⋅ >ε γ εd i .
Finally,  E
F KI~1
  can be calculated from
d F
d KI
d
d KI
C T KZ PF
PF
d F T KZ PF
d KI
~ , , ~ , ,1 1 1 1 1 1 1
=
∂
∂
F
HG
I
KJ=
b g b g
by using again the chain rule of differentiation .
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Elasticities which enter x(p1; KI), x(p2; KI), x(Z; KI), x(K, K1; KI)
The elasticities which enter x(p1; KI) and x(p2; KI) are ε
α
αCT p
i
i, .
=  because we normalize
prices to be unity in the base year. Therefore α
α
i
iw.
=  is the cost share. Furthermore,
ε
β
T p j
ij
i
i j
w
w,
= +  .
The elasticities in x(Z; KI) are:
ε ε ε
α
αCT KZ T KZ F KZ
K
K
i, , ~,
= = = −
−1
ε
α
α
τ
τ
ε
α
α
ρ
ρ
ε ε ε
τ
τ
ε
ε
τ
ε
α
p KZ
K
K
K
K
p KZ
K
K
K
K
p KZ C KZ F KZ
K
K
p KZ
F T
K
F T
K
1
1
1
2
2
2
1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1
2 1
1 1
1
1 1 1 1
1
0
1
1
1
1
, ,
, , ~ , ,
~ , ~,
, ,
, ,
, .
= −
−
F
HG
I
KJ −
F
HG
I
KJ = − − −
= = = −
−
=
=
−
=
−
Elasticities which appear in x(K, K1; KI) do also appear in x(Z; KI). Finally, the only
elasticities in x F KR( ~; )  are
ε ε ε
ζ
ζp K p K C K
K
K
1 2 2 2 2 2
2
2
0
1, , ,
,= = = −
−
 .
